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Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers
Popular Attitudes Towards Ottoman Christians During 
the Armenian Genocide*
ŞTEFAN IONESCU
WWI Ottoman Empire, especially its Eastern part, was a mosaic of ethnic and 
religious groups. Inter-group relations during the Ottoman rule varied, from peaceful 
coexistence to random violence. Especially in the 19th century, the traditional tolerance 
of Ottoman rulers towards their Christian and Jewish subjects – historically framed 
into the Millet system – started to deteriorate. The increasing military and economic 
decline of the Empire, the expansion of Tsarist Russia, the interference of European 
Great Powers in Ottoman domestic affairs, the rise of ethno-nationalist movements 
of Christian groups within the Empire and on its borderland (gradually turned into 
nation states, such as the Balkan states), and the rise of Turkish nationalist movement 
influenced the evolution of the Empire. Various reformers tried to stop this trend and 
modernize the state following the models of European powers, but with unsatisfac-
tory results1. 
At the turn of the century, different paths for the future of the Empire were con-
templated, varying between pan-Islamism and ethno-national statehood. In 1908, the 
Committee of Union and Progress (henceforth CUP, formed by intellectuals, officers, 
etc., also known as the Young Turks) came to power and tried to reform and moder-
nize the Empire, emphasizing political participation by transforming subjects into 
citizens. At the beginning, CUP displayed favourable attitude toward local minorities 
and even collaborated with the Armenian political parties. CUP’s attitude towards 
Christian minorities changed significantly after the territorial losses suffered at the 
end of the Balkan Wars, and after the arrival of numerous Muslim refugees perse-
cuted by the victorious Christian nation-states. Faced with harsh and humiliating 
defeats at the hand of their former subjects and pressured by the Great Powers’ con-
stant interference into the domestic affairs of the Empire, CUP leaders, many of whom 
hailed from the lost Balkan provinces, gradually became radicalized2. 
* I would like to thank Dr. Tatyana Macaulay (Clark University) and Alex Macaulay (New 
York University) for their helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1  The Ottoman Millet system was based on religious affiliation and allowed extensive 
fiscal and judicial autonomy to confessional communities. However, Christians and Jews did 
not enjoy full equality with their Muslim countrymen. See Donald QUATAERT, The Ottoman 
Empire 1700-1922, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
2 There is a substantial literature on the role of nationalism during the last decades of the 
Ottoman Empire and it aftermath. See, for instance, Taner AKCAM, From Empire to Republic: 
Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide, Zed Books, London and New York, 2004; IDEM, 
A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, Metropolitan 
Book, New York, 2006; Donald BLOXHAM, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, 
and the Destruction of Ottoman Armenians, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Vahakn 
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In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered WWI on the Central Powers (Germany and 
Austro-Hungary) side, experiencing several defeats against Russian armies on the 
Caucasus front (Sarikamish – January 1915) and struggling to contain the Gallipoli 
landing (starting in April 1915) of British and French troops attempting to capture 
Constantinople. The Ottoman siege of the city of Van, defended by local Armeni-
ans (April-May 1915), further increased the besieged mentality of CUP leaders. The 
measures adopted during those days – purging Armenian soldiers from the army, 
assembling, mass-murdering, and deporting civilians – suggest that CUP leaders 
decided (when exactly it is still debated, but most probably in the Spring of 1915, 
following the Gallipoli landing, and perhaps after the Van conflict) to eliminate their 
Christian minorities (especially Armenians) whom they perceived as serious domes-
tic threats1. The number of casualties of these deportations and massacres is still deba-
ted. Estimates range between 300 000 and 1 500 000 Armenian victims, and between 
100 000 to 250 000 Syriacs2.
In this article I explore the popular attitudes of Ottoman Muslims (especially 
Turks and Kurds)3 and foreign residents (German, US, British, and so on) towards 
their Armenian and Syriac friends, neighbours, and countrymen during the tragic 
events that occurred in WWI Ottoman Empire, known in Western scholarship as the 
Armenian Genocide4. More precisely, I am interested in examining the various pat-
terns of behaviour of Muslims and foreign residents towards Armenians and other 
Christians, in the ways these were perceived and recorded by foreign eyewitnesses 
and Christian victims during the first part of WWI (1915-1916).
Therefore, my paper reflects the perspectives of survivors and foreign obser-
vers, reflected in their diaries, letters, and interviews that had been compiled during 
DADRIAN, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia and 
to Caucasus, Berghahn Books, New York, 2004.
1 Besides Armenians (the largest and the most influential Christian minority), CUP 
leaders targeted other Christian groups, such as Syriac communities (Assyrians, Nestorians, 
Chaldeans). Following the model of David Gaunt, I use the generic term Syriac to designate 
a variety of Christian groups (such as Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans, and Nestorians), of 
different denominations, who used variants of the Aramaic language. Numerous members of 
these communities were located in the borderlands of the Ottoman Empire during WWI. David 
GAUNT, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during 
WWI, Gorgias Press, Piscataway, 2006, pp. 1-28; Taner AKCAM, From Empire to Republic…cit.; 
Donald BLOXHAM, The Great Game of Genocide...cit.; Vahakn DADRIAN, The History of the 
Armenian Genocide...cit.
2 It is difficult to assess the number of the victims from each ethnic-religious group because 
of problematic access to unbiased and accurate reports and statistics, movements of population, 
and identity/belongingness controversies. The Assyro-Chaldean delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference estimated that a number of 250 000 Ottoman Assyrian-Chaldeans died in battles 
and massacres between 1914 and 1919. See David GAUNT, Massacres…cit., pp. 300-303.
3 The Ottoman Muslims involved in WWI events were especially Turks and Kurds, but 
also Arabs, Circassians, Chechens, so on.
4 See, for instance, Taner AKCAM, A Shameful Act...cit.; IDEM, From Empire to Republic...
cit.; Donald BLOXHAM, The Great Game of Genocide...cit.; Vahakn DADRIAN, The History of 
the Armenian Genocide...cit.; Robert MELSON, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the 
Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992. For a pro-
Turkish perspective, see Guenter LEWY, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed 
Genocide, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2007.
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the events in The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916. Edited and 
published in 1916 by Viscount Bryce, the book was the first important collection of 
primary sources concerning the annihilation of Ottoman Armenians and other Chris-
tians during WWI, and even today represents a major resource for any scholarly 
investigation of this topic1. By implementing strict censorship of communications 
and an absolute travel embargo for Armenians, the Ottoman officials tried to prevent 
the dissemination of any news about atrocities perpetrated against local Christians, 
but with only partial success2.
The patterns of behaviour of Ottoman Muslims and foreign residents varied from 
active persecution to indifference, opportunism and occasional help and rescue. I 
argue that the attitudes towards the Armenians and other Christians were influen-
ced by different factors, such as greed, social conformism, careerism, cruelty, perso-
nal relationships, official propaganda, and anti-Armenian and anti-Syriac prejudices. 
Overall, the attitudes of Ottoman Muslims towards local Christians fit into the per-
petrators/bystanders/rescuers paradigm3. Thus, the Ottoman officials (bureaucrats, 
soldiers, gendarmes, etc.) and a minority of Muslim civilians (especially Turks and 
Kurds) did perpetrate mass murder and other atrocities against Armenians and Syri-
acs. Usually not engaged in direct murder and torture, the majority of civilians were 
bystanders, who often became perpetrators and accomplices in order to benefit from 
the persecutions of their countrymen. Finally, a minority of Ottoman Muslims did 
oppose the persecutions, sometimes only partially, by means of expressing public pro-
tests or by helping individual Christians. The historical context was extremely com-
plicated and often there were no ultimate distinctions between the categories taken 
here into account. While sometimes bystanders turned into perpetrators or accompli-
1 The Ottoman and Turkish governments dismissed the testimonies gathered by Viscount 
Bryce as British war propaganda. However, many of these eye-witness accounts came not only 
from citizens of the Ottoman Empire’s enemies, but also from citizens of its allies – German 
and Austro-Hungarian militaries, diplomats and other civilians – and neutral countries (such 
as USA, Switzerland, and Sweden). See Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire 1915-1916, Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, London, 1916, pp. 13, 26-27, 91, 96-97, 
305-309, 541. On the issue of denial of the Armenian Genocide, see Richard HOVANNISSIAN, 
”The Armenian Genocide and Patterns of Denial”, in IDEM (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in 
Perspective, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 1987; IDEM (ed.), Remembrance 
and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1999. 
2 See Viscount BRYCE, The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 6, 79, 246, 343-344. Many 
Armenian and Syriac survivors fled abroad where they testified about their experiences. 
Foreign observers – missionaries, diplomats, health care staff – residing in Eastern Anatolia 
during WWI, sent their accounts abroad to various organizations or newspapers or returned to 
their countries and narrated what they saw or heard.
3 I chose to examine the categories of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers, because of 
their relevance in the case of the Armenian genocide and of interesting inter-group dynamics. 
I use a changed version of the model popularized by the Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg – 
perpetrators/bystanders/victims. The concept of perpetrators would describe those individuals 
(belonging to state apparatus of just simple citizens) who decided the fate of Ottoman Christians 
and directly participated to their persecution. Bystanders refers to people living in the genocidal 
area, who were neither perpetrators nor victims, people who heard or saw something about 
the Armenian tragedy but were not ”involved”, in the sense of not being willing to hurt 
the victims nor wishing to be hurt by the perpetrator. By rescuers I understand people who 
helped persecuted Armenians in one way or another. See Raul HILBERG, Perpetrators, Victims, 
Bystanders: the Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945, Aaron Asher Books, New York, 1992.
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ces, in other contexts they became rescuers. Therefore, the separation between these 
three main categories is often a fluid one and they are not easily quantifiable. In 
general, the foreign residents’ behaviour proved much more favourable toward local 
Christians than those of Ottoman Muslims. Foreign residents’ behaviour was influ-
enced by their worldview and prejudices towards ”uncivilized” and ”savage” Turks/
Orientals, and by a sense of common belongingness (along with the victims) to the 
same religious community – Christendom. Many of the foreign residents in Ottoman 
Empire were protestant missionaries looking for proselytes among Armenians and 
Syriacs. However, not all foreign residents did help persecuted Christians: some of 
them (especially German officers) became active perpetrators and profiteers, or just 
indifferent bystanders.
This article scrutinize, first, the debate over the conceptualization of the Ottoman 
radical policies that targeted local Christians: was it a genocide or a tragic civil war 
triggered by the victims’ provocation? Then it explores some theoretical aspects of 
human behaviour during WWI Ottoman Empire, and follows up with a discussion of 
the various motivations of the actions of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers.
The Annihilation of Armenians between Genocide 
and Victims’ Provocation
In the historiography of the Armenian genocide, the ”provocation thesis” played 
and still plays a vital role in justifying the Ottoman actions during WWI. According 
to the provocation thesis, the death of Armenian civilians during ”relocations” and 
”random killings” was not part of a premeditated genocidal policy, but simply the 
result of a ”civil war” turmoil, combined with catastrophic famine and epidemics, 
which caused the death of many Muslim civilians as well. Thus, in order to avoid the 
responsibility for the genocide, the Ottoman and, later, the Turkish authorities blamed 
the Armenian victims for provoking their own destruction. This pro-Ottoman posi-
tion argues that, driven by their radical ethno-nationalisms, Armenians and Turks 
engaged in a deadly struggle during WWI, for the possession of the same area that 
both sides regarded as a vital part of their national territory, and further, that, in gene-
ral, the Armenians behaved as disloyal rebels who favored Tsarist Russia. According 
to the Ottoman and Turkish narrative, there were significant proofs of Armenian trea-
son: the preparation for ”rebellion” (amassing arms and establishing political revo-
lutionary organizations) against the legitimate Ottoman authorities, further, several 
cases of Armenian armed resistance, most notably the Van ”rebellion”, and the par-
ticipation of Armenian volunteers in the Russian army. According to the same narra-
tive, the Young Turks responded in the only way any legitimate government would 
act, namely by trying to suppress a domestic uprising and to remove dangerous ele-
ments from the conflict area (borderlands)1. 
Under closer scrutiny, it seems that the ”provocation thesis” is not consistent 
with the reality on the ground in several points. To begin with, at that time, Armeni-
1 For a pro-Turkish perspective, see Guenter LEWY, The Armenian Massacres…cit.; 
Stanford SHOW, Ezel Kural SHOW, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2nd vol., 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977; Justin MCCARTHY, The Armenian Rebellion at 
Van, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 2006.
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ans had neither a state of their own nor a proper army, and not even a coherent and 
strong resistance movement. Although there were some Armenian volunteers in the 
Russian army and some Armenian guerillas within the Ottoman Empire, the Turks 
held an overwhelming superiority of the state power over their Armenian ”oppo-
nents”. At the individual level, the role of Armenian volunteers within Russian army, 
especially after the defeat of Ottoman forces at Sarikamish, triggered the fear and 
hostility of many local Muslims towards the Armenian communities behind the front 
lines1. It is not clear to what extent the role of Armenian volunteers was or was not 
exaggerated by the Ottomans. Regardless of the controversy surrounding the deci-
sion-making process2, what it seems to be clear is that CUP central government deci-
ded – influenced by ethno-nationalism and security concerns (possible Great Powers 
interference) – to annihilate its Christian citizens, such as Armenians and Syriacs, 
considering them a domestic threat to the Empire3. 
On the political level, although there were some Armenian nationalist parties, 
the Hanchackist and the Dashnaktsutiun, their leaders realized that a complete sepa-
ration from the Ottoman Empire was impossible due to the geographical and social 
repartition of the Armenians, who lived in mixed villages and towns across Anatolia 
together with different Muslim groups. The majority of the Armenians were peasants 
living in remote villages and they were politically more passive than active in a poten-
tial struggle for independence. Many of the Armenian leaders rather wanted to obtain 
equality of rights or some form of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, and not to 
become a province under the Tsarist autocracy4. 
As to the behavior of Armenian soldiers within the Turkish army, it seems that, 
in general, they proved to be loyal and brave in battles against the Russian army, in 
whose favor they were later accused to have betrayed5. Therefore, the Turkish claim 
that the Armenians were ”traitors” favoring Tsarist Russia does not seem to reflect the 
more complex military reality of Eastern Anatolia. Some Armenians defected from 
the Ottoman army, hid within local communities or joined the guerilla groups or 
the Tsarist army, but they seemed to represent a minority of the Armenians living in 
the borderlands, and an even a smaller minority compared with the entire group of 
1 See, for instance, the case of Erzeroum, where local officials and returning Ottoman 
officers blamed the Armenian volunteers for the defeat against Russian Army and urged radical 
measures against Armenian civilians. Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., 
pp. 231, 233, 237.
2 When did the CUP leaders decide to annihilate the Armenians and Syriacs? Before 
WWI, immediately after the war started, after the Russian victories on the Caucasus front, or 
after the Gallipoli landing? Some historians argued that the annihilation of Armenians was 
planned long before WWI. See Vahakn DADRIAN, The History of the Armenian Genocide...cit.; 
other historians, such as Hilmar Kaiser, argue that there was no longstanding plan or blueprint 
to eliminate the Armenians when the opportunity arose. Hilmar KAISER, ”A Scene from the 
Inferno: The Armenians of Erzerum and the Genocide 1915-1916”, in Hans Lukas KIESER, 
Dominik SCHALLER (eds.), Das Volkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah/The Armenian 
Genocide and the Shoah, Chronos, Zürich, 2002, p. 172. 
3 See Tanner AKCAM, A Shameful Act…cit.
4 Robert MELSON, Revolution and Genocide…cit., p. 157.
5 Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Defense Minister, praised the Armenian troops for their 
bravery in the battle of Sarikamish. Ibidem, pp. 158-159.
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Ottoman Armenians1. These initiatives need to be interpreted in the wider context of 
regional tensions created by forced conscriptions, requisitions (often sheer looting), 
and other unlawful practices by Ottoman officials. Moreover, Armenian soldiers were 
subjected to a persecutory treatment in the Ottoman army: they were disarmed, used 
for menial work, humiliated, half-starved, abused, and gradually murdered by the 
Ottoman military2.
Overall, the evidence suggests that there was no plan for a general rebellion of 
the Armenian population, but only few, isolated, and desperate last-stand type of 
defensive actions against the attacks of Ottoman soldiers and their auxiliaries. These 
very few cases of resistance took place only after local Armenians and Syriacs heard 
from refugees and survivors about the tragic fate of neighboring Christian commu-
nities, and tried to avoid the same fate. The building up of these resistance cases fol-
lowed the same pattern: procurement of weapons, abusive requisitions of men, inco-
ming information about violence against Christian communities, isolated skirmishes, 
provocative violence by Ottoman forces – beating, murder, rape, and looting – against 
local Christians3. The case of the Van ”revolution” illustrates the same pattern. Even 
the strategic and technical aspects of these cases of resistance suggest that they were 
defensive battles, some last-stands of local inhabitants trying to avoid the complete 
destruction of their communities. The Armenians and Syriacs, barricaded in their 
neighborhoods, defended themselves against numerically superior and better armed 
Turkish and Kurdish assailants4.
The theory of the necessary ”preventive measures” adopted by the Young Turks 
regime in order to remove the ”dangerous” Armenians from the conflict area is con-
tradicted by the reality of the ”relocations”: they targeted not only the population 
from the conflict (border) areas, but almost all Ottoman Armenians, including peo-
ple located far away from any military zone, such as those living in Constantinople, 
Bursa, Angora, Konya, Eskishekir, and Diyarbekir5. Moreover, these ”relocations” 
targeted not only the remaining potential dangerous able men, many of whom had 
been already conscripted into the army, but also Armenian women, children, and the 
elderly. During the events, the Ottoman authorities tried to sway the public opinion 
about the goals of the ”relocations”: asked about the destination of the deportation 
1 The Ottoman searchers for Armenian defectors hiding among local communities triggered 
abuses and tensions. See Anahide Ter MINASSIAN, ”Van 1915”, in Richard HOVANISSIAN 
(ed.), Armenian Van, Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, 2000, pp. 214-215; Viscount BRYCE (ed.), 
The Treatment of Armenians…cit, pp. 31-78. 
2 See David GAUNT, Massacres…cit, pp. 66-67; Anahide Ter MINASSIAN, ”Van 1915”, 
cit, p. 215.
3 Such as those from Van, Sassoun, Mussa Dagh, Urfa or Azakh. For the case of Urfa, 
Azakh, and Ayn Wardo (the last two by Syriac Christian), see David GAUNT, Massacres…cit., 
pp. 202-205, 264-267, 273-294, 403-404; for Van and Sassoun, see Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The 
Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 31-78, 83-87; Donald MILLER, Lorna Touryan MILLER (eds.), 
Survivors An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1999, pp. 72-72, 76-77.
4 See Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 31-78; see also Anahide 
Ter MINASSIAN, ”Van 1915”, cit, pp. 209-244.
5 See Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 28, 38-406; Vahakn 
DADRIAN, The Key Elements in the Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of 
Distortion and Falsification, The Zoryan Institute, Cambridge, MA, 1999, pp. 11, 17-18; David 
GAUNT, Massacres…cit., p. 300.
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convoys from Erzeroum and Baibourt, the governors replied that the purpose was ”to 
save” the Armenians from the anger of the local mob by sending them to a safe place 
until the end of the war1. Referring to another version of the official deceit, a German 
observer realized that the official claim that the purpose of the relocation of Arme-
nian civilians into the Syrian desert was to employ them in ”colonizing land” around 
Bagdad Railway, meant ”nothing less that the wholesale murder of the [Armenian] 
families”2.
Furthermore, the whole concept of ”relocation” proves highly problematic: the 
Armenians and other Christians were not safely relocated in protected convoys to 
other regions of the Empire. Instead, in most of the cases, they were subjected to long 
and deadly marches, which meant rapid killing of males, rape and kidnapping of 
females and children, starvation, thirst, and exposure. In general, the lack of minimal 
subsistence preparative – including at the terminus point (Syrian dessert) – would 
suggest, at best, a complete neglect and lack of interest in the fate of the deportees, if 
not premeditated criminal intent. If we take into account also the behavior of the con-
voy guards, the gendarmes, who were often involved in the murder, rape, and looting 
of their deportees in complicity with roaming gangs of criminals, this better fits the 
pattern of organized death marches aiming to destroy the deportees. Observing the 
deportations foreign eyewitnesses residing in Eastern Anatolia concluded that ”all 
these details plainly show that the massacre was deliberately planned” aiming to eli-
minate ”the Armenian race”3.
Opportunism and Corruption During the Genocide
Opportunism and corruption are often encountered in the context of political, 
military, and social upheaval, but vary according to local practices, ideological wor-
ldviews of officials and ordinary citizens, and public policies. During the Armenian 
genocide systematic opportunism and corruption were the most prevalent features 
influencing the behavior of Ottoman Muslims towards their Christian countrymen. 
The personal interests of Turks, Kurds and other Muslim groups – for example, the 
probability of gaining property, jobs, sexual gratification, and slave labor – shaped 
their attitudes towards local Christians. I use the concept ”corruption” in a wider 
sense, loosely defined as a dysfunction of the state system and of individual morality, 
which affects the preeminence of law and moral rules in the relations between state 
(and its officials) and citizens, as well as among citizens themselves. In my understan-
ding the essence of corruption as a social practice is made of the mutual goals envisio-
ned by the participants and the inequality of power between the two parties engaged 
in an illegal transaction. Regarding the dominant part of the corruption, I consider as 
dominant agents not only the bureaucrats, but also ordinary citizens, who, without 
acting in an official role, chose to take advantage of the differences in status and gain 
personal profits. 
Genocidal epochs determine the empowerment of many citizens belonging to the 
”privileged” group(s), devolving them – as a state sanctioned initiative or just infor-
1 Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 121, 234.
2 Ibidem, p. 26.
3 Ibidem, pp. 91, 264. 
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mal acts – a considerable power over the members of the targeted group(s). During 
the Armenian genocide, however, besides the direct economic profit, the moral cor-
ruption of the perpetrators embraced other aims, such as upward social mobility, 
sexual gratification through rape and sexual violence, slave labor, or sadistic pleasure 
from exerting power and torturing the victims1.
Ambiguity of Behavior During Genocide 
As in many other cases of mass violence, no clear cut conclusions based on eth-
nic affiliation can be draw about the perpetrators, bystanders and rescuers: people’s 
behaviors during WWI were neither positive nor negative, but there were also many 
ambivalent and changing attitudes towards the victims. For example, the case of 
Ottoman Kurds is extremely relevant in this sense: various Kurds represented a major 
category of perpetrators and profiteers, whose violence had been channeled against 
Christian Ottomans. Kurdish bands had been involved in looting, raping, and mur-
dering deportees, as well as kidnapping attractive women and children2. While many 
Kurds participated in the atrocities, other Kurds helped or offered asylum to Chris-
tian escapees because of friendship or for certain benefits3. At the same time, there are 
also testimonies about individual Turks who helped Armenians during the genocide 
or about Turks who expressed their compassion for Christians’ plight4.
The difficulty to quantify group attitudes during the genocide is obvious also 
in the case of Muslim rescuers who offered hiding places to persecuted Christians 
and later pressured them to convert to Islam. Other friendly Muslims offered to hide 
the property of fleeing Christian neighbors, but refuse to return it, when the rightful 
owners asked it back. Even though, many foreign diplomats and missionaries hel-
ped Armenians and Syriacs, others refused to help them despite repeated Armenian 
requests5. 
In another case that illustrates the ambiguity of human behavior during geno-
cidal epochs, some local Turkish bystanders who ”could not stand the wailing” of 
100 Armenian men imprisoned without food and drink who kept begging for bread, 
pressured the local government ”either to give them bread or kill them”6. The local 
officials decided to kill them. To which category of behavior would the Turkish inha-
bitants fit: perhaps (selfish) bystanders or indirect perpetrators?
1 Rape and sexual violence perpetrated by Ottoman men against Christian women, girls, 
and children were a wide-spread practice during WWI, even though, due to the nature of these 
crimes, survivors and foreign eye-witnesses used a variety of euphemisms – such as ”outrage”, 
”abducted”, ”violated”, ”condition worse than death”, ”brutal treatment by their captors”, 
”dishonored”, ”treated barbarously”, ”awful deeds”, ”indescribable deeds”, ”to be their sport” 
– to describe the sexual violence. See Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., 
pp. 20-21, 27, 92, 110, 117, 135, 166, 248-249, 225, 242, 243, 265.
2 Hilmar KAISER, A Scene from the Inferno…cit, p. 163. See also Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The 
Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 85, 92, 94, 114, 162, 165, 223, 237, 241, 247, 262, 265-266, 270. 
3 Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 94, 119-120, 235, 247.
4 Ibidem, pp. 399, 401.
5 Ibidem, pp. 123, 126, 269, 272, 347.
6 Ibidem, p. 94.
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Gendered Violence
The Young Turks’ policy of annihilating their Christian citizens presents clear 
signs of gendered violence, with specific measures targeting specific categories of 
victims based on gender criteria. While usually most of the men were killed immedi-
ately, women were sometimes spared outright murder, and were often subjected to 
sexual violence, kidnapping, and forced marriage or labor for their predators1. That is 
why men tried to escape alive by disguising themselves wearing women’s clothing, 
a strategy that did not always succeed2. Ottoman perpetrators targeted in particular 
young women and girls. In this sense, a German, traveling from Eastern Anatolia to 
Constantinople, noticed that ”we encountered only old women. No young women 
and girls were to be seen”3. Young age did not save the girls from sexual assault. 
According to a survivor’s testimony, Kurdish guards of a large deportation column 
”very often…violated eight or ten-year-old girls” in public view4. Another measure 
targeting specifically Christian women and girls was their sale at public auctions at 
ad-hoc slave markets along the deportation routes. Thus, local Muslims were able to 
buy and sell Armenian women and children. For instance, in Vezir Kopru (Marsovan 
District) all the Armenian women and girls aged 7 to 40 years old were sold at public 
auctions5. Gendered violence refers not only to victims, but also to perpetrators: in 
general, men were those committing most of the atrocities against Christian civilians. 
Sometimes also women had their share of violence, such as in the case of Kurdish 
women who arrived with their butcher knives to help their men engaged in the mur-
der of Armenian deportees from Harpout6.
Ideology
Ideology represented a major motivation behind the genocidal policies against 
Ottoman Christians. There were different types of ideological reasons that justified 
the persecutions of Armenians and Syriacs, such as ethno-nationalism, racism, politi-
cal and religious considerations. The press played an important role in disseminating 
anti-Armenian and anti-Christian propaganda: for example, newspapers from the 
capital argued that it was in the state’s interest to have a homogenous population7.
Overall, it seems that certain Turks internalized the official propaganda and 
invoked racial, ethno-national, and religious reasons for participating in the perse-
cution of Armenians and other Christians. Armenians were also depicted in terms 
of racial hygiene/Darwinism, as a fatal disease – cancer – for the body politic of the 
country8.
1 Ibidem, pp. 23, 84-85, 104, 135, 161, 165-166, 217-218, 265.
2 Ibidem, pp. 243, 247. 
3 Ibidem, p. 91.
4 Ibidem, p. 92.
5  Ibidem, pp. 13, 23, 234, 238, 246, 274.
6 Ibidem, p. 91.
7 Ibidem, p. 390.
8 Ibidem., p. 396.
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The Armenians were considered such a political (”they were all Anarchists”) and 
economic threat to the future of the state that their physical removal was regarded as 
an indispensable measure to be implemented at any cost, even if ruining the economy. 
Eyewitness accounts reveal that Ottoman officials, aware of the economic paralysis 
that was to be brought about by the annihilation of Armenians – who represented the 
majority of commercial and industrial entrepreneurs – were ready to assume such 
risks1. 
Some ordinary Turkish perpetrators reflected the official ethno-nationalist rhe-
toric and saw the removal of Armenians as part of a larger ethnic-cleansing plan that 
would have gradually eliminated all foreign minorities from the national community: 
”First we kill the Armenians, then the Greeks, then the Kurds”2.
Others seemed convinced of the moral superiority of Islam over Christianity and 
of an apocalyptic fate for the Armenians – perceived as doomed by deity: 
”Armenians committed atrocities at Van because their religion is inferior. 
The Moslems should not follow their example, but should have carried the 
massacre with greater humanity….God has no pity on them”3.
Other Turkish religious leaders openly urged for the massacre of Armenians, 
as allegedly responsible for the defeat by Russians4. The importance of the religious 
motivation appears from the often encountered practice according to which Chris-
tians – especially women and children – were spared deportation or murder if they 
become Muslims. But not all those willing to convert were in fact accepted: Christian 
men usually did not have that option, and in several towns Armenians had to pay bri-
bes in order to be able to convert to Islam5. In certain areas the permission to convert 
to Islam as an escape avenue from deportation (and death) was opened according to 
social status: in Broussa, for instance, only rich Armenians were allowed to convert, 
while the poor ones were deported. However, not always conversion to Islam meant 
the avoidance of deportation6.
Sadist Perpetrators
Eyewitness testimonies suggest that the pleasure to exercise power over Chris-
tian civilians, and the pleasure of inflicting pain – such as various tortures (eye-brows 
plucked out, nails torn off) and mutilations (cutting off male genitals and women’s 
breasts) – played a major role in the conduct of some perpetrators7. Thus, the motiva-
tions behind the behavior of certain Ottoman tormentors did not seem to have been 
pure rational (functional) – simply killing Armenians or looting their property – but 
also included a desire to enjoy dominance over people previously of a higher social 
1 Ibidem, pp. 251, 396, 403.
2 Ibidem, p. 253, 342.
3 Ibidem, p. 250.
4 Ibidem, p. 231.
5 Ibidem, pp. 341, 347, 391.
6 Ibidem, pp. 5, 14, 18, 23, 27, 391.
7 Ibidem, pp. 21, 26, 90, 94, 225, 243.
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status, and a desire to humiliate them in front of their family and community. Confir-
ming this hypothesis, some Armenian survivors near Bitlis observed that ”the object 
of massacres was not simply to kill, but to torture”1. Only in this way one could inter-
pret the horrible and gratuitous acts of torture and mutilation of bodies, together with 
the accompanying cheerful atmosphere, laughs, and joyful mood2. For instance, a 
German eyewitness noticed that the soldiers laughed and ”took great delight in hea-
ring” the cries of Armenians adults and children who were burnt alive in their hou-
ses3. Perhaps one of the most suggestive explanations came from a gendarme, who 
detailed the frightful torments of the deportees to foreign residents who asked him 
why the Armenians were tortured through long death marches, and not simply killed 
in their villages: ”It is best as it is. They ought to be made to suffer”4. Other Ottoman 
perpetrators enjoyed boasting in public about their crimes against Armenian civili-
ans, and expected praise for their achievements or perhaps, just wished to show off 
their manliness5.
Arrivists
Social upward mobility represented a powerful incentive for many Ottoman 
bureaucrats to commit genocide: those sufficiently zealous during the persecution of 
Armenians have been promoted, such as the Kaimakan of the town of Develou (Kai-
seria), who personally marshaled the torture of Armenian inmates and who was pro-
moted to a higher position in the Vilayet of Constantinople6. Overall, from a bottom-
up perspective, it seems that the initiatives of local officials, who competed to prove 
their vigilance in uncovering real or alleged Armenian conspiracies, contributed to 
the radicalization of the central government that decided on increasingly harsher 
measures against threatening domestic enemies. For instance, in order to prove his 
zeal, the Vali of H. used deceits, threats, and arbitrary arrests of Armenian notables to 
collect proofs of their alleged preparation for a rebellion and forwarding these imme-
diately to the central government, asking for permission to suppress the impending 
Armenian revolution7.
Obeying Orders: Rational and Conformist Perpetrators 
While some perpetrators enjoyed torturing and murdering Christians, others 
disagreed with the cruelties and justified their own criminal behavior against civili-
ans by invoking rational reasons, such as a legitimate source of authority (superiors’ 
orders) or the alleged treason of Armenians. For instance, faced by several foreign 
1 Ibidem, p.18.
2 Ibidem, pp. 21, 90, 238. 
3 Ibidem, p. 90.
4 Ibidem, p. 252.
5 One such hero bragged that ”he ruined eleven Armenian girls, two of them under seven 
years of age”, while others showed off that they have got rid of ”all the Armenians.” Ibidem, 
pp. 89, 161.
6 Ibidem, p. 23.
7 Ibidem, p. 259.
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residents who were horrified by the murder of women and children, several Ottoman 
soldiers deflected the responsibility for the killings and argued that they could do 
nothing to prevent those crimes because they received official orders to do so. Other 
executioners who invoked obeying orders were proud or just indifferent of their cri-
minal activity1.
Local Corrupted Officials
Among Ottoman officials, the Valis – the governors – enjoyed the greatest power 
at the local level and they played a major role in the persecution of Armenians, imple-
menting radical measures, such as dispossession, torture, deportations, and mass 
murder2. There are testimonies about Valis (and their aids), who claimed or accepted 
valuables from certain Armenians in order to protect them or to attenuate the perse-
cutions. What seemed to have been a major feature of this type of transactions was 
that, the Vali and other officials, did not always keep their part of the bargain and in 
the end, their Armenian ”protégés” were also deported3.
Despite their considerable power, the provincial Ottoman officials had been 
aware of the influence of the central government, and, in general, feared its retalia-
tions. It seems that this fear influenced the way local officials behaved towards the 
Christians and the extent to which they been involved in corruption. Several eyewit-
nesses mentioned cases when American missionaries attempted to bribe Ottoman 
officials or Kurdish leaders in order to protect Armenians and Syriac victims4. This 
strategy did not always work: in the town of X., for example, after serious disagree-
ments with the commander of Gendarmerie and other officials on how to share the 
bribes, in the end, the Kaimakan was afraid to accept the money from the American 
religious envoys5.
Ottoman Officers, Soldiers, and Gendarmes
Officers comprised a special group of perpetrators that is often mentioned for 
its involvement in the persecution of Armenians. Overall, it seems that Ottoman offi-
cers were less involved in direct murders, but they participated in coordinating and 
supervising the murders, pursuing material profit, kidnapping, and sexually abusing 
women and girls. There were cases, however, when officers tried to preserve order 
and prevent robberies by local Muslims6. Ottoman soldiers are also mentioned as 
direct perpetrators of atrocities against Christian civilians. Sometimes, returning from 
1 Ibidem, pp. 223, 248, 251.
2 Not all the Valis behaved the same, and some of them were quite reluctant to carry out 
the order to kill the local Armenians. Ibidem, p. 223. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 352-353, 363.
4 See for instance the case of Dr. Packard from Urmia, who rushed to a Christian village 
– besieged by Kurds – and managed to persuade the attackers’ leader to spare the lives of 1000 
people in exchange for surrendering their goods. See Ibidem, pp. 116-117.
5 Ibidem, p. 364.
6  Ibidem, pp. 12-13, 88, 120, 225, 368. 
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the front lines after military defeats, the Ottoman soldiers seemed particularly willing 
to use violence against the civilian coreligionists of their Russian enemies1.
Gendarmes represented another category of Ottoman officials perpetrating atro-
cities against Armenian and Syriac civilians. Charged with preserving the domestic 
order and policing the rural areas, the gendarmes escorted the deportation caravans. 
As the official guardians of these convoys, gendarmes engaged in various cruelties 
and looting at the expense of deportees, and, in general, they better fit the category of 
perpetrators and accomplices, instead of deportation convoys’ protectors. According 
to various testimonies, sometimes the gendarmes simply fraternized with the gangs 
of ”brigands” in victimizing the deportees they had to escort2.
The Changing Category of Bystanders 
One of the most common characteristics of the Armenian genocide was the ten-
dency of many Muslims to take advantage of the difficult situation of Christian gro-
ups. They got rich by confiscating Armenian and Syriac property, obtained sexual 
gratification and slave labor, all actions favored by the state policy, which in some 
cases was not clearly formulated from the beginning3. The central government tried 
to control the plunder of Armenians, to ”Turkify” their property for the benefit of the 
state. Public auctions were organized in order to finance grandiose state projects and 
to rapidly create a Turkish middle class, but the reality showed how difficult it was 
to control the ravenousness of local Muslim civilians. Competing with local greedy 
individuals, the CUP government sent several Special Commissions to take care of the 
property of the deportees and to liquidate the so-called abandoned goods and real-
estate4. Especially the mobile valuables of the Armenians and Syriacs, such as money, 
precious metals, and jewelry, by their nature more difficult to identify and seize, was 
easy prey to the voracity of Ottoman officials and local civilians. 
As any cautious law abiding citizens would do, the predators were sometimes 
preoccupied with respect for legal formalities during the appropriation of Armenian 
real estate: these robberies were often disguised as legal transactions with the com-
plicity of Ottoman judicial authorities5.
The desire for personal profit transformed many ordinary Ottoman citizens from 
bystanders into active accomplices and perpetrators of the genocide. For instance, 
Turkish and Kurdish neighbors, inhabitants of Anatolian towns and villages located 
on the deportation routes, often attacked the caravans, robbed the deportees, and 
1 Ibidem, pp. 163, 165, 180. 
2 See Ibidem, pp. 9, 13, 20-21, 24-25, 85, 231, 234, 265, 342.
3 For the city of Erzurum, Hilmar Kaiser argued that the deportation of Armenians has 
not been prepared long in advance because local authorities did not have a swift and coherent 
policy of confiscating property and lacked detailed instructions from the center up to June 1915, 
when the deportations started. See Hilmar KAISER, A Scene from the Inferno…cit., pp. 129-185.
4 Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 21, 24, 227.
5 See, for instance, the cases when Armenians were forced to sign ”contracts” attesting 
the transfer of their property to Muslim owners, in exchange for money that were immediately 
confiscated by authorities and used for the next ”transaction”. See Ibidem, p. 395; see also the 
cases when some Turkish business owners told a curious Kurd that they have bought the stores 
from previous Armenian owners. Ibidem, p. 241.
341
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XI • no. 2 • 2011
kidnapped Armenian women and children. In certain locations of Eastern Anato-
lia, the kidnapped Armenian women were placed at the disposal of male public, for 
whom they had to provide sexual services. Thus, in the town of Mezre, all good-loo-
king Armenian women and girls were placed in a newly opened public brothel, and 
”at night Turks were allowed free entrance”1. Sometimes local Turkish neighbors and 
officials did not wait for the deportation to take place and robbed Armenian property 
in the presence of the rightful owners2. Usually, many neighbors and near-by villa-
gers rushed in for bargains, either before the deportation (buying at derisory prices 
or simply robbing the desperate Armenians), or immediately after the deportations 
(looting the abandoned property or moving into Armenian houses). In some cases, 
Muslim refugees from the Balkans were those who installed themselves in houses of 
the deportees 3.
Muslim Bystanders Becoming Rescuers 
Not everywhere the relations between Muslims and Christians had been antago-
nistic. In Bitlis, for instance, Kurdish and Armenian communities agreed on a mutual 
protection scheme in case of emergency, but all the plans failed when a radical Tur-
kish leader arrived in the region and his troops started to massacre the Armenians4. 
Not every Muslim behaved as a perpetrator or greedy profiteer. Some did oppose 
the cruel treatment of Ottoman Christians. Thus, several Muslims (a mullah and a 
Muslim notable) criticized the persecutions against Armenian women and children 
as contrary to the Muslim religious law. These cases show that certain religious and 
political leaders, who criticized the cruelties perpetrated against Armenians from a 
religious/ethical perspective, did so only on behalf of women and children, while 
they (implicitly) accepted the atrocities against Armenian men5. 
In other contexts, Turks, Kurds, and Arabs helped various Armenians and Syri-
acs. Sometimes, entire Christian villages entered under the protection of a certain 
Kurdish chief. While many of these Muslim rescuers previously knew their protégés, 
others did not and they were described as ”kind” or ”merciful” individuals. Someti-
mes, the vital help was just a warning to run away and hide, enough to save the life 
of the beneficiary6.
Difficulty of Helping Persecuted Christians
When assessing the issue of Ottoman Muslims who opposed the official mass-
murder campaign and saved their Christian countrymen, one should take into account 
that helping Armenians posed serious risks for the potential rescuers. The Ottoman 
1 Ibidem, p. 91.
2 Ibidem, pp. 395, 402-403. 
3 See Hilmar KAISER, A Scene from the Inferno…cit., p. 136; also Viscount BRYCE (ed.), 
The Treatment of Armenians…cit., pp. 17, 234, 240, 241, 246, 403, 411-412. 
4 Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., p. 84.
5 Ibidem, p. 348.
6 Ibidem, pp. 24, 122, 157, 167, 180-181, 217, 274.
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government issued strict orders according to which any Muslim who would shield 
his Armenian friends would be punished as severely as his protégés, and testimonies 
mentioned Turkish civilians hanged for such a ”crime”1. Other accounts show how 
the central government threatened to punish the Kurds who would not participate 
in the official attacks against local Christians2. Thus, the actions of those Turks and 
Kurds, who dared to save Christians despite the high risks involved by such behavior, 
are quite remarkable within the WWI context. Individual Muslim (would be) rescu-
ers faced considerable risks not only from government’s retaliations, but also from 
other Turks who disagreed with their altruistic behavior3. Moreover, aiming to pre-
vent foreigners from observing the atrocities against local Christians or helping the 
victims, the Ottoman officials imposed certain travel and meeting restrictions even 
on the citizens of its main ally, Germany. The government also warned an Austrian-
Hungarian diplomat who demanded an explanation in the case of several Armenians 
murdered in Smyrna, that as an ally, he ”ought not to meddle in such questions”4.
Foreign bystanders, especially the citizens of the Ottoman Empire’s allies, Ger-
many and Austro-Hungary, as well as of the neutral states (USA), had a ”privileged” 
status and sometimes could intervene on behalf of persecuted Christians with higher 
chances of success. Christian missionaries, diplomats, medical staff, educators, and 
other foreigners residing in WWI Ottoman Empire made up the bulk of these bystan-
ders turned into rescuers5. Overall, American protestant missionaries, doctors, and 
educators were among the most active foreign rescuers, providing shelter, hiding 
place, relief aid, and pleading before Ottoman authorities in favor of Armenians and 
Syriacs6. Helping the persecuted Christians and refusing to cooperate with Otto-
man perpetrators posed certain security risks even for apparently inviolable citizens 
of the Great Powers, and not all their rescue attempts were successful7. In spite of 
Germany’s policy of non-interference in the ”internal affairs” of its Ottoman ally, Ger-
man individuals managed to save certain Armenian women, girls, and children8. Not 
all Germans were examples of moral behavior during the genocide: several German 
militaries contributed to the atrocities. For instance, they participated in the massacre 
of Armenian civilians, in organized deportations and lootings9. According to several 
eyewitness accounts, German officers had been particularly active in kidnapping and 
raping Armenian girls in Erzeroum: ”German officers…took their share of the booty. 
Almost every one of them had kidnapped Armenian girls”10.
1 Ibidem, pp. 238, 348.
2 Ibidem, pp. 180-181.
3 Ibidem, p. 249.
4 Ibidem, pp. 246, 391.
5 Ibidem, pp. 13, 248, 250.   
6 Ibidem, pp. 96, 109-111, 224, 228-230. 
7 Mr. Allen, an American missionary, was beaten twice by Turkish soldiers, who broke 
into the mission’s building to look for certain men. Later they killed several refugees hosted in 
the building. Viscount BRYCE (ed.), The Treatment of Armenians…cit., p. 117.
8 Ibidem, pp. 18, 95, 235, 238, 246.
9 Ibidem, pp. 86, 94-95, 235.
10 Ibidem, pp. 235, 238-239. 
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Survival Strategies During the Genocide
While some Armenians, as law-abiding citizens, did comply with the official 
measures and did not oppose legal persecutions, others did not accept them and 
resisted one way or another. One of the most radical forms of opposition to genoci-
dal policy was armed resistance. Following the martial traditions of the area (almost 
everybody possessed arms) and informed of the Ottoman forces’ murderous prac-
tices, many Christians resisted the official attempts to be disarmed (similar measu-
res did not apply to Muslim neighbors) and to be deported, and they murdered the 
Ottoman official1. Usually, Ottoman authorities labeled these episodes of resistance 
as rebellion and brought in the regular army and auxiliary forces to defeat defying 
Armenians and Syriacs. In general, these resistance episodes were relatively easily 
defeated by overpowering Ottoman forces, but some survivors managed to escape to 
the mountains and engage in guerilla warfare2. Although these did not have the same 
”heroic” reputation as the armed resistance, non-armed resistance strategies were no 
less important in saving lives. 
In genocidal contexts, when members of the targeted group are not able to resist 
militarily against the perpetrators, societal context enables them to use other sur-
vival strategies such as corruption, hiding, fleeing, pleading for international help 
and foreign protection, and disseminating information about persecutions. Overall, 
it seems that the most widespread non-armed survival strategy were hiding, fleeing 
and gaining the protection of Ottoman officials and local Muslims by offering them 
various incentives. Often, the deportees had to bribe their guards in order to gain pro-
tection from roaming criminals, to be transported faster (by train), or on better and 
safer roads to the deportation sites3. Even if corruption is held in low esteem by the 
ethical systems of most societies, it could make the difference between life and death, 
and from the victims’ perspective, it might have been a successful strategy of resis-
tance against radical policies. 
Having heard about the atrocities perpetrated against local Christians, many 
Armenians and Syriacs chose to resist persecutions by fleeing and hiding in various 
places, such as friends’ houses, mountains, and forests, or they crossed the border 
into the Russian Empire4. Hiding was not easy and required a lot of resourcefulness 
from its practitioners. Noticing the official policy of gendered violence (immediate 
murder of men and boys), one woman disguised her fiancé in woman’s clothing and 
hid him among other deported women, while other woman hid her son under her 
skirt5. Although highly controversial, suicide, often committed collectively, represen-
ted another resistance strategy employed by Christian women to escape sexual vio-
lence, tortures, and deportation. Sometimes, women committed suicide together with 
their dear ones, or after they killed their own children6.
    
1 Ibidem, pp. 81-82, 85-87, 121, 167, 169, 172, 175, 178, 188. 
2 Ibidem, p. 87.
3 Ibidem, pp. 24, 273, 267.
4 Ibidem, pp. 81, 82, 85, 87, 92, 93, 167, 173, 217, 274, 355. 
5 Ibidem, pp. 218, 247.
6 Ibidem, pp. 84, 87, 180, 218, 260, 266. 
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Conclusion
Today, the Armenian Genocide is one of the most debated topics in current histo-
riography of genocide and politics. Despite the difficult access to the archives, nowa-
days we know a lot about the annihilation of Armenians and Syriacs by CUP autho-
rities in WWI Ottoman Empire. Among the many available sources documenting the 
fate of Ottoman Christians, eyewitness accounts and victim testimonies are crucially 
important to the researchers, allowing them an insight into the popular attitudes of 
ordinary Ottomans and foreign residents. Contrary to the pro-Turkish mainstream 
narrative that depicts Armenian and Syriac victims as unfortunate casualties in a 
civil war struggle, allegedly caused by the provocation of the victims, combined with 
extensive famine and epidemics, the available evidence suggests the existence of a 
coordinated policy of Young Turks to annihilate the local Armenian and Syriac com-
munities. According to international criminal law this type of actions represents the 
crime of genocide. Overall, it seems that the origins of the Armenian genocide rested 
with the CUP’s radical revolutionary ideals and xenophobic nationalism adopted 
after the failure of the Pan-Islam ideology, military defeats, and territorial loses suffe-
red in the European and African parts of the Empire as a result of the interference of 
the Great European Powers.
At the level of ordinary people, widespread opportunism, corruption, greed, 
ideological worldviews – such as racism, ethno-nationalism, and religious intolerance 
– social conformism, careerism, cruelty, personal relations, and official propaganda 
shaped the attitudes of local Muslims towards their Armenian and Syriac neighbors. 
These patterns of behavior fit the perpetrators/bystanders/rescuers paradigm. Many 
Ottoman officials and some civilians acted as executioners and tormenters of Ottoman 
Christians. While majority of Muslim civilians behaved as bystanders, often transfor-
ming themselves into profiteers and accomplices, a minority of them opposed the 
persecutions of Christians. Different types of behavior towards Armenian and Syriacs 
could also be identified among foreign residents of the Ottoman Empire, although, 
due to their religious beliefs and worldviews they were much more inclined to help 
the victims of Ottoman persecutions, whom they regarded as their co-religionists. 
